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Individual Conscience Under Military Compulsion
by Raymond B. Marcin

The exercise of individual conscience
under military compulsion is an issue
revived by the My Lai courts martial.
Natural law jurists saw a place for
individual conscience, but the
positivist school's dominance
changed that. The Nuremberg
doctrine denied the defense of
superior orders, and now the debate
is raging again.

D

URING the recent My Lai courts
martial, some defendants proffered the argument that whatever was
done at My Lai was done under the
compulsion of the military order of a
superior officer. In another incident, a
young man named Guy Gillette, after
being denied conscientious objector
status, refused military induction because he considered the Vietnam War
immoral and illegal? These two seemingly unrelated incidents form an unlikely combination in that they raise
the same question of the individual
conscience under military compulsion.
That question raises an issue so fundamental that it must, for the record, be
reviewed from the perspective of legal
history.
The issue of individual conscience
under government compulsion has not
often been the most eager subject of
inquiry for jurisprudence. It was unavoidable, however, at Nuremberg,
where no defendant was permitted to
escape responsibility for a war crime
by claiming that the act was compelled
by the order of a superior authority.
Article 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal provided:
"The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of
a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the tribunal determines that justice so requires."
This principle of individual accountability, sometimes favorably hailed according to the temper of the times, at
other times has lost its shield of popular support and, standing alone and
unarmed as a rule of law, occasionally
has become an embarrassment. 2 The
question raised by Nuremberg and expanded by subsequent debate is this:
May the individual decide for himself
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the morality of a particular command
or even of a particular war?
The Nuremberg precedent was not
new law. The proceedings before the
Supreme Court at Leipzig after World
War I made use of a similar rule
of law. Although the Versailles peace
treaty authorized war crimes trials
by the victorious Allies, it was understood that the stability at the time
of the Weimar Republic demanded
that the trials of war criminals be
German trials. So it was that the Leipzig trials were under German law
and employed Section 47 of the German Military Penal Code, providing
that a subordinate may be punished if
he is aware that his superior's orders
directed action which involved a civil
or military crime or misdemeanor. As
it happened, this rule of German military law eventually became the Nuremberg precedent. Moreover, it has been
called an axiom of English and American law "that the plea of superior
3
order is no defense to an illegal act".
The modern era is not the first time
in which the dilemma of individual responsibility under military compulsion
has been aired for debate. Augustine
tersely stated and resolved the dilemma
in one sentence: "[A]n unjust order
may perhaps render the king responsible, while the duty of obedience preserves the innocence of the soldier."
The municipal law of Rome was in accord with Augustine's approach of excuse or immunity: "He does the in1. Gillette v. United States, argument of
counsel at 39 Law Week 3253 (1970).
2. See United States v. Mitchell, 246 F.
Supp. 874 (D.Conn. 1965). reversed and re-

manded, 354 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir. 1966).
3. 2 GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
WORLD WAR 485 (1920). See also, Mitchell

v. Harmony, 13 How, 115, 137 (1851) : Little
v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 179 (1804), and

Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowper 161, 180
(1774).

Individual Conscience
jury, they say, who orders that it be
done; there is then no guilt on the part
of him who has to obey." 4
In the fourteenth century Giovanni
da Legnano, a professor of civil and
canon law at the University of Bologna, commented that soldiers "ought
to obey their generals, because if they
disobey their commands, even in a
good cause, they are punished with
death nonetheless [emphasis supplied]". But he also clearly emphasized
the duty of a subject not to help his
ruler when his ruler was waging an
5
unjust war against the Church.
In an age not known for its attention
to the rights of the individual, the natural law jurists of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries addressed themselves, with commendable earnestness,
to the problem of conscience under
compulsion. Francisci de Victoria, the
Spanish theologian and professor at
the University of Salamanca, drew on
sacred scripture to assert in 1532: "If
a subject is convinced of the injustice
of a war, he ought not to serve in it,
even on the command of his prince.
. . . [S]ubjects whose conscience is
against the justice of a war may not
engage in it whether they be right or
wrong [emphasis supplied].."
Pierino Belli, Italian statesman and
jurist, felt the weight of the dilemma
when, in 1558, he agreed that "when
the injustice of a lord is clear and
manifest, a vassal is not bound to assist the lord". But he went on to caution that "it would be a perilous thing
for vassals and subjects to pry into motives".7
So it was that the ancients, accustomed as they were to the obedience of
a slave to a master, saw little difficulty
in granting immunity to one who acts
unwillingly under the compulsion of a
military order, whereas the early natural law jurists, concerned as they were
with the "just war", saw of necessity
the stirrings of the individual human
conscience.
Balthazar Ayala, the Dutch lawyer
and military commander, observed in
1582 that "if it chance that [a ruler's]
motive for making war is human
greed, that will not be imputed to the
soldiery as a sin, seeing that they owe

obedience to their prince. . . . [S]ub.
jects may campaign under a pagan and
even heretic commander, unless it be
transparently clear that the war is unjust; for service is due to God rather
than to man [emphasis supplied]."s
Refrain from Action
If Cause Is Unjust
Of the natural law jurists, the great
Dutch humanist and international lawyer, Hugo Grotius, gave us in 1625
probably the most complete treatment
to that date of the problem in his De
lure Belli ac Pacis. Stated Grotius: "If
those under the rule of another are ordered to take the field, as often occurs,
they should altogether refrain from so
doing if it is clear to them that the
cause of the war is unjust." 9
Grotius cited Victoria and was one
with him in upholding the natural law
right of the individual to decide for
himself whether or not the particular
war is just. His observation that in
"former times men laughed at Stratocles who had proposed a law at Athens
that whatever pleased King Demetrius
should be held to be reverent toward
the gods and just among men" seemed
to hold the opposing viewpoint up to
ridicule. The opposing viewpoint did
not, however, escape Grotius's objective scan: "Pertinent is the saying of
Tacitus: 'To the prince the gods have
given the supreme right of decision;
for his subjects there remains the glory
of obedience.' . .. Says Seneca: 'The
slave is not the censorer, but the servant of his master's order.' "
In full consistency with his declaration of the individual's right to decide
and conscientiously to refrain, Grotius
developed historical precedents for the
individual's right to know. He quoted
Tertullian: "No law must keep to itself
alone the understanding of its uprightness, but must impart such knowledge
also to those from whom it expects
obedience." And he punctuated this
with his own view: "Declarations of
war in fact . . .were wont to be made
publicly, with a statement of the cause,
in order that the whole human race as
it were might judge the justness of it.
Of a truth wisdom is the virtue characteristic of the ruler . . .but justice is
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the virtue characteristic of a man in so
far as he is a man."
For conscientious objectors Grotius
advocated an exemption not unlike the
substitute purchase system'0 of Civil
War days: "Now if the minds of subjects cannot be satisfied by an explanation of the cause of a war it will by all
means be the duty of a good magistrate to impose upon them extraordinary taxes rather than military service.
Grotius's solution to the dilemma of
4. Quoted by GnoTus, DE JURE BELLI AC
PACIs 590, 591 (Classics of International
Law edition, Oxford Press, 1925).
5. DA LEGNAN O, TRACTATUS DE BELLO, DE
REPRESALIIS ET DE DUELLO 234, 236 (Classics

of International Law edition, Oxford Press,

1947).
6. VICTORIA,
of
(Classics

ON THE LAW OF WAR 173
Law edition,
International

1917).
7. BELLI, A TREATISE ON MILITARY MATTERS AND WARFARE 63, 65 (Classics of Inter-

national Law edition, Oxford Press, 1936).
8. AYALA, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND ON
THE DUTIES CONNECTED WITH WAR AND ON
MILITARY DISCIPLINE 21, 22 (Classics of International Law edition, Oxford Press, 1912).
9. GaOTIUs, DR JuE BELLI AC PACIS 587
(Classics of International Law Edition, Ox-

ford Press, 1925).
10. 12 Stat. 731, 733.
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conscience and the unjust war or unjust military order represented a somewhat higher degree of humanitarian
sophistication than did the solution of
the Romans. The Romans and others
proposed immunity from prosecution
for the individual who was compelled
to participate in the unjust war or to
perform the unjust act. Grotius, while
noting their proposal, chose for his
own a principle of exemption for con.
scientious objectors-thus not only resolving the dilemma but also, and
more important, avoiding the outrage
committed upon the human conscience
by compulsion.
The Spanish scholastic philosopher,
Francisco Suarez, seemed to be in accord with his contemporary when he
stated in 1612 that "common soldiers,
as subjects of princes, are in no wise
bound to make diligent investigation,
but may go to war when summoned to
do so provided it is not clear to them
that the war is unjust [emphasis supplied]". However, Suarez went on to
qualify his position: "[W]hen the injustice of the war is not evident to
these soldiers, the united opinion of
the prince and of the realm is sufficient
to move them to this action. ....
[S]ubjects when in doubt . . . are
bound to obey their superiors."
Suarez, too, felt the weight of the dilemma and seemed to be unable to
focus on it decisively:
[I]f the doubt [as to the justice of a
war] is purely negative, it is probable
that the soldiers in question may
[rightfully] take part in that war without having made any examination of
the question, all responsibility being
thrown upon the prince to whom. they
are subject. . -. If. however, the doubt
is positive, and if both sides advance
plausible arguments, then, in my opinion, [those who are about to enlist]
should make an inquiry into the truth
of the matter. If they are unable to ascertain the truth, they will be bound to
follow the course of action which is
more probably just, and to aid him
who is more probably in the right."1

but modified them with his own practical observation:
[W]e ought to be very cautious how
we determine in this matter about such
things as these, for fear we should
weaken the Force of the Civil Power,
and make the obedience of the subject
in a Matter of so much Importance,
depend upon every particular Man's
Judgment, especially since in this case
it would be easy for a Man to pretend
Conscience only13to disguise his Fears
and Cowardice.
In the eighteenth century the Swiss
international lawyer, Emmerich Vattel,
penned views which harkened back to
the Roman position when he wrote:
"Soldiers . . . are but instruments in
the hands of their commanders." Prescinding from the lengthy debate over
conscience that had preceded him, Vattel stressed an unequivocal and unqualified duty to obey the sovereign:
The sovereign is the real author of
war, which is made in his name and at
his command. The troops, both officers
and soldiers, and in general all those
persons by whom the sovereign carries
on war, are only instruments in his
hands. They execute his will and not
their own.
Every citizen is bound to serve and
defend the state as far as be is able.
Society cannot otherwise be preserved;
and this union for common defense is
one of the 1first
objects of all political
4
association.
Vattel's Law of Nations,
1758, marked the first
break with the natural law
jurisprudence and signaled

Fifty years later Samuel Pufendorf,
the famous international lawyer at the
Universities of Heidelberg and Lund,
foresaw and accurately stated presentday fears' 2 when, in his Law of Nature
and Nations, he cited Grotius's views
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written in
significant
school of
the ascen.

15
dency of the positivist school. So it
was that the United States Supreme
Court, in its omnibus decision on the
constitutionality of the Draft Act of
1917. could rely solely on the writings
of Vattel, without a hint of the grand
debate that had preceded them:

It may not be doubted that the very
conception of a just government and
its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to
render military service in case of need
and the right to compel it. Vattel, Law
of Nations, Book III, c. 1 and 2.'6
It could perhaps be said that the
grand debate of the natural law jurists
on the problem of the individual conscience under military compulsion died
with the rise of the positivist school of
jurisprudence. But, more accurately
perhaps, it could be said that the grand
debate died for lack of a real forum.
For it was that simple provision of a
real-life forum at Leipzig, at Nuremberg and at Vietnam that has revived
that very same debate.
11.

SUAREz,

A WoRK

ON

THE

THREE

THEO.

LOGICAL VIRTUES, DISPUTATION XIII ON WAR
832, 836 (Classics of International Law edition, Oxford Press, 1944).
12. See Justice Minton's dissent in Sic t-

rella v. United States, 348 U. S. 385, 395
(1955),

where he cautions lest one be al-

lowed to "choose the wars in which he shall
fight".
13. PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE
AND NATIONS 782 (Oxford edition, 1703).
14. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 319
(Classics of Internatonial Law edition, Oxford Press, 1916).
15. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (1964).

16. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S.
366, 378 (1918).

No Boners
Something overlooked!
Thought of it for a moment
Went to something else
trembling with apprehension
how could I forget it!
The papers are signed what
a blunder what to do
temples pounding stomach contracting
No excuses

No mistakes can be made
what shall I tell the client!
-EL

E. FiNK

Chicago, Illinois

